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Three Criticisms of Schopenhauer
and a Response from the Advaita Vedantins
Brian York

J

udging by the amount of scholarly literature dedicated
to each, Schopenhauer is considered less important than
Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. The majority of secondary
literature either focuses on his relation to a more prominent figure or criticizes his system for not being internally harmonious. In this paper I intend to examine three critiques
of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, each of which claims that his philosophy is not internally consistent. Throughout this paper I will
refer to the three problems as the knowledge problem, the nihilism problem, and the incoherency problem. While examining
these critiques, I will use Indic philosophy to help revive Schopenhauer’s system. All three of these critiques are in some way
related to Schopenhauer’s aesthetic contemplation, and within
Indic thought an analogue is found in meditation. Throughout
this paper, these two types of meditation will be used as a reference point.
Before addressing the knowledge problem, a preliminary
note is needed. Indic philosophy is almost as diverse as the
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western philosophical tradition. When I speak of Indic philosophy, I will be referring to the school known as Advaita Vedanta, or
non-dualist Vedanta. Vedanta is one of the six orthodox schools
in ancient Indic philosophy,1 and advaita is one of its sects.2
Among these schools there circulated a standard body of texts,3
some of which were more closely associated with one school
than with others. For instance, a book like the Yoga Sutras was
closely tied to the Yoga school, yet all of the schools used and
developed a commentarial tradition on the text. Thus, when I
speak of an Indic concept my point of view will be that of the
non-dualist Vedantins. The tenets of this school will become
clear throughout this paper, although it should be remembered
that my goal here is not to elucidate the similarities or differences
between Schopenhauer and Vedanta. The task at hand is to use
Vedanta to help ward off the attacks made against Schopenhauer.
The first problem I call “the knowledge problem.” Before I
begin examining the problem, it will be useful to discuss Schopenhauer’s view of knowledge. The groundwork for Schopenhauer’s epistemology was laid by Kant. Thus for Schopenhauer,
space and time are merely intuitions of the mind, while causality
is one of the manifestations of the principle of sufficient reason.4
This principle states that any representation can be explained by
reference to a separate or preceding representation, just as classical physics tells us. As a result of this, reason and all of its concepts are valid only in relation to experience, which necessarily
takes place in space and time. Except for a special experience
called “aesthetic contemplation,” everything in the phenomenal
world is guided by principle of sufficient reason, which for our
purposes is simply causality. The principle of sufficient reason is
completely deterministic. It holds necessarily and absolutely determines the way in which the world changes.
Aesthetic contemplation is an experience during which we
gaze not just on an object, but upon its Form or Idea understood
in the Platonic sense. Schopenhauer calls the Platonic Ideas the
adequate objectification of the will.5 As such, they are the intermediary between the fluctuating world of sense-perception and
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from the will by virtue of being differentiated from each other.
As a result of this, the objects of aesthetic contemplation are different from the objects of everyday sense-perception and require
a different mode of epistemological access. Schopenhauer says,
“if the Ideas are to become [the] object of knowledge, this can
happen only by abolishing individuality in the knowing subject.”7 In other words, a corresponding change---—from individuated to non-individuated—must be found in both subject and
object if the latter is to be known by the former.
Keeping that preface in mind, we can now state the
knowledge problem: How can a human being, whose brain and
perceptive faculties fall under the principle of sufficient reason,
grasp the Platonic Forms, which do not fall under the principle of
sufficient reason? While introducing the will as the thing-initself, Schopenhauer says, “besides the will and the representation there is absolutely nothing known or conceivable to us.”8
The Platonic Ideas lie in a vague area that is still representation,
yet they lie closer to the will than sense-perception. In some
way, then, there must be a continuum from the most concentrated and unwavering aesthetic experience of a Platonic Idea to the
most etiological and causally focused awareness of a particular
object. Perhaps, if we can find a correlating continuum of states
from the side of the subject, we can dissolve the knowledge problem by saying that aesthetic contemplation lies on one extreme of
the epistemological spectrum. Schopenhauer does indeed give
us such a description. He says, “our consciousness has two
sides; in part it is consciousness of our own selves, which is will,
and in part consciousness of other things.”9 He also says that,
“apprehension of the Idea. . .springs only from a temporary preponderance of the intellect over the Will, or, physiologically considered, from a strong excitation of the brain’s perceptive activity, without any excitation of inclinations or emotions.”10 It
should be kept in mind here that each person’s body is simultaneously will and representation of will.11 We can now see the
corresponding continuum from both the sides of object and subject. When we are contemplating a Platonic Form, our consciousness is focused exclusively on the object of perception and not on
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the object’s relation to our will. When we are on the other side of
the epistemological extreme we are focused on causality insofar
as it will help us satisfy a desire. For instance, I can stare at a soda machine and look at it in two different ways. I can contemplate the properties of plasticity, electricity, and gravity in an attempt to understand the nature of the things I see, or I can focus
on the causal mechanisms which will result in me obtaining a
soda (feeding in a quarter, pushing the button, electrical pulses
being sent to the mechanism which drops the soda out of the
slot, etc).
According to this explanation, de-individuated
knowledge comes about when we reside on one extreme of the
continuum.12
This answer does not seem completely satisfactory. First, the
principle of sufficient reason does not lie on a continuum. It either applies or it does not. Secondly, the innermost nature of all
things is will. Where intellect or knowledge appears, it appears
as a servant to the will.13 Even when the intellect has a
“temporary preponderance” over the will, as is the case during
aesthetic contemplation, the will is still there. It seems questionable to cite the brain’s activity as the means by which we forget
our will. By doing this, Schopenhauer seems to go against his
earlier claim that the body is the will. He says, “the act of the
will and the action of the body are not two different states. . . but
are one and the same thing. . . This applies to every movement of
the body. . . [including] involuntary movement following on
mere stimuli.”14 The neurological processes that occur in the
brain during perception are an example of “involuntary movement following on mere stimuli.” It is unknown how a process
falling under the control of the principle of sufficient reason
could produce an experience that does not. Schopenhauer says
that in humans, the intellect has the unique power to overthrow
its master, the will,15 but he does not explain how this is possible.
If the continuum suggested earlier is accurate, then Schopenhauer seemingly cannot account for this phenomenon. Knowledge
that falls outside of the principle of sufficient reason should not
lie on the continuum; it should be a further leap past the most
concentrated and non-causally focused concentration. Because
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knowledge arises out of the will, will-less knowledge seems impossible. For the object to remain while the will vanishes is inconceivable: it is as if one removes the premises and still expects
the conclusion.
This problem rises not because contemplative experience is
unbelievable, but because Schopenhauer’s metaphysics do not
logically allow for it. Within the Indic tradition, we see a practice
nearly identical to aesthetic contemplation: meditation. These
two activities are curiously similar. According to the Yoga Sutras, there are eight “limbs” of yoga.16 Of these eight limbs or
steps, the last four deal with varying stages of meditation. In ascending order, they are: disengagement of the senses, concentration, meditation, and absorption. These four states roughly correspond to the continuum we saw earlier, where one begins by
viewing the world as a conglomeration of objects meant to please
the senses. The stage in which we disengage the senses is somewhere in the middle of the spectrum where we try to stop desiring. Concentration and meditation may be seen as varying degrees of mental focus. Eventually, one views objects not as possible ways of satisfying the senses, but as objects upon which to
meditate. The final stage of meditation, called absorption or Samadhi, is further split up into five subcategories. The first two
seem to have direct overlap with aesthetic contemplation. According to the first traditional commentator of the Sutras, Vyasa,
the first of these stages involves taking up an object with complete focus.17 Naturally, this would involve not letting one’s self
desire or want the object upon which one is meditating. The second stage, according to various commentators, is when we see
the “subtle elements” of the object previously meditated upon.
Within Indic physics, the subtle elements of all material things
are called gunas. They are the three basic constituents of all material and mental bodies, and also have a quality associated with
them. The three gunas—sattva, rajas, and tamas—are associated
with the qualities of lucidity, activity, and heaviness. The differences in objects that we encounter in the world arise because of
differing constituents and different ratios of the gunas. The natural disposition of objects to behave in a certain way arises from

26

Brian York

the gunal composition of the thing.
We have shown that there exists a parallel between the two
types of contemplation. In Schopenhauer’s version we see the
inner nature of a thing as will; we notice the way in which all
things move, desire, or tend to a certain behavior that is natural
to its kind. Similarly, when contemplating the gunas or subtle
elements of a thing, we are focusing on the three elements of material nature that are responsible for the natures and movements
of all things. It is not at all a stretch of the imagination to equate
these two contemplative states.18 The difference is that in the Indic tradition this is not the final stage of contemplation. According to some commentators of the Yoga Sutras,19 the third stage
involves contemplating thoughts and the sense organs themselves, while the fourth stage has the most basic part of the mind
as its object.20 The fifth and final stage is when the soul or atman
becomes fully aware of itself.
The metaphysical differences between Schopenhauer and the
Vedantins have now become evident. Schopenhauer says that
the will, which has “striving [as] its sole nature,” is the nature of
all phenomena.21 The Vedantins claim that the core of every living being is an atman, which is variously identified as the “ear of
the ear; . . . the eye of the eye,”22 or the “unthought thinker; the
unknown knower.”23 In short, the atman is consciousness. All
psychical activity, however, is a product of the three gunas,
which together are called prakriti. But the atman may not be
pure consciousness. In the Kena Upanishad we see a student ask
his guru, “Willed by whom does the directed mind go towards
its object?”24 The answer to this is the entity which is described
as the ‘ear of the ear; . . . the eye of the eye.’ Although the main
power of this atman is consciousness, it is plausible to locate
some sort of agency in the atman itself, as the Brahma Sutras do
explicitly.25
It appears that we may have found a solution to Schopenhauer’s knowledge problem. If Schopenhauer were to admit two
things, he could solve the knowledge problem. First, if he were to
admit that the fundamental part of a sentient being is the foundation of consciousness, he would be able to account for
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knowledge.
More specifically, he could account for deindividuated experience, because the knowing entity does not
fall under the rule of the principle of sufficient reason. It is immaterial, and according to the Vedantins, it is the same in every
conscious being.26 This gives the inner-most self an ontological
status identical to the Platonic forms. It also still allows for normal perception. The brain and body still operate according to
the principle of sufficient reason, and normal perception occurs
when the atman is conscious of the brain’s activity. Schopenhauer can also still maintain that all things, with the exception of
the inner-most self, have will or striving as their essence, because
this striving and will only manifests itself in the gunas, which are
distinct from the atman. An entity that has the fundamental nature of receptivity does not will in the way Schopenhauer claims
it does, but all of its gunally composed objects do. Schopenhauer
can still maintain that the body is nothing but the will, because
the atman is wholly different from the body. All willing and
striving does arise from the body, but the body is not the same as
our inner-most self. The second thing he must give up is the implicit claim that consciousness arises from the brain. Schopenhauer never talks about the nature of consciousness directly, but
he counts it among the powers of the intellect, often using
‘consciousness’ as a synonym for ‘perception’ or ‘abstract awareness.’27 If Schopenhauer were to admit that consciousness is different from intellect, he could still maintain that the entire world
of representation has the nature of will. Since Schopenhauer is a
transcendental idealist, he maintains that the intellect produces
matter and, therefore, will.
The second problem is called “the nihilism problem,” and it
deals with the aim of ethics. Upon having an experience of aesthetic contemplation one sees that the innermost nature of all
things is will, and then strives to silence it.28 In the concluding
chapter of the World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer
speaks of “deliverance from a world whose whole existence presented itself to us as suffering.”29 For Schopenhauer, the will is
nothing but unsatisfied desire and suffering.30 Unfortunately,
Schopenhauer also says that the “human will is always directed
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to its own well-being, which in sum is comprehended under the
concept happiness.”31 If we are to stop suffering, then we must
stop the search for happiness. This is a fundamental point in
Schopenhauer’s ethics. Schopenhauer uses the phrase “denial of
the will-to live,” or “mortification of the will” to refer to this behavior.32 The problem is that by denying the will-to-live, one denies reality. To phrase this more strongly, one may say that
Schopenhauer has as his goal the denial of what is most fundamental and real, in favor of nothingness.33 Although this is not a
logical problem, it is intuitive that denying the foundations of
reality is in someway mistaken, although Schopenhauer would
claim that our intuitions merely support his theory of the will-tolive.
Foreseeing this objection, Schopenhauer says that the concept
of nothingness is essentially relative and dependant on one’s
point of view. For instance, when doing arithmetic one can make
a negative number positive by adding a second negative sign.
This reversal of qualities is possible only because negativity, and
by extension the concept of nothingness, are relative concepts.
Because nothingness is a relative term, “absolute nothingness”
has no meaning. It is an incoherent concept. Human beings are
phenomena of the Platonic Form “human.” As such, we are the
objectified will-to-live. From our point of view, denying the will
“appears . . . as a transition into empty nothingness.”34 From a
different point of view it would appear as the best of all possible
transitions. According to Schopenhauer, this transition into
nothingness is what superstitious dogmatists variously call
“ecstasy, rapture, illumination, union with God, and so on.”35
The problem with this view is that there can be no other point of
view than the one we have. The will is the sole existent. The only other fathomable point of view is that of non-existence, and
that is by definition not a point of view. If the will is fundamental, as Schopenhauer claims, his ethics necessarily amount to a
denial of reality, which always appears to us as something bad.
The Vedantin philosopher will also admit that “[f]or one who
has discrimination, everything is suffering.”36 In this phrase, the
word “everything” means “everything physical,” or “everything
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that is prakritic.”37 The equivalent to “prakriti” in Schopenhauer’s thought is “representation.” The difference is that representation is will (the cause of suffering). For the Vedantin, prakriti is
the cause of suffering. It is either fundamentally separate from
the atman, or connected with it in virtue of being derived from
the same source.38 This is important, because the Vedantins will
only admit that all of life is suffering, so long as it is viewed in a
certain way. But they will deny that Brahman, the ultimate
source of everything, is the cause of suffering. Rather, the cause
is misidentifying our true selves with our bodies and minds,
which is precisely what Schopenhauer does. It is the nature of
prakriti to change, deteriorate, and eventually annihilate everything it brings forth.39 As Schopenhauer correctly points out, it is
the will’s essential nature to strive against and consume itself.40
Like the knowledge problem, Schopenhauer can still hold the
belief that the body is the will, but he cannot maintain that the
will is the most fundamental nature of our selves. If he were
willing to admit that at our core was a conscious being, he could
still maintain the transient and painful nature of all representation and not be accused of denying reality. From this new perspective, suffering arises from a misidentification of the body
with the self, not from the inner-most nature of reality.41
The last problem arises not while looking at the goals of
Schopenhauer’s ethics, but while examining the feasibility of putting them into practice. I call this “the incoherency problem,”
and it relates to “the nihilism problem” in that it is an attempt to
carry out the actions learned from contemplation. The issue is
whether it is possible to silence the will without willing in the
process.42 In describing ethics and ethical living, Schopenhauer
presents a three tiered account: the first and second are found in
the essay On the basis of Morals, while the third is in the final
chapter of The World as Will. The first stage of ethical action is
negative, while the second is positive. In the negative account
Schopenhauer describes the virtue of justice. Justice is that
which “steps before me, checking the inherent anti-moral powers
in me, as a result of which I cause others to suffer, calling me to
‘stop!’”43 The second stage, which is positive, is called loving
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kindness. Schopenhauer says that loving kindness “does not just
restrain me from hurting another, but even impels me to help
him.”44 These virtues both arise out of compassion, which is the
immediate identification of, and participation in, another’s suffering.45 The third step is again negative, and one no longer acts
out of compassion or virtue. In The World as Will, Schopenhauer
says that when a person “recognizes the true nature of things-inthemselves, and thus the whole, [he] is no longer susceptible [to]
such consolation. . . The phenomenon by which this becomes
manifest is the transition from virtue to asceticism.”46 The ascetic
is the human who “ceases to will anything.”47
At this point we may ask whether this view is logically consistent. Every action and movement of the body is an action of
the will. This must be the case with the lack of action as well. To
examine this more closely we may enquire into suicide, of which
Schopenhauer often speaks.48
Generally, Schopenhauer is
against suicide. He says that it is a misguided attempt to silence
the will that ultimately fails. Suicide is a manifestation of the dissatisfaction with one’s particular condition, and not with life itself.49 There is a special type of suicide, however, that is the utmost extreme of asceticism: starvation.50 All other suicides attempt to eliminate suffering by cutting life short. In this case
however, the suffering is prolonged, and the will does not affirm
itself by eliminating the pain involved in life. The difference between these two situations seems harder to distinguish than
Schopenhauer supposes. If an action takes severe discipline or if
the results are painful, then it is an act of the will to refrain from
responding. It could not be otherwise. If it were, we might ask,
what is causing you to not will? The will causes one to not will,
or as Nietzsche puts it, to will nothingness. At this point, Schopenhauer might object that to cease acting is to cease willing: The
body is the will, but only its movements are willed. You do not
will yourself to stay motionless during a deep sleep, he might
say. To this one could respond by pointing to pleasure and pain.
It is true that our bodies can be at rest without it being willed.
An ascetic’s body, however, incurs great hardship and pain. According to Schopenhauer, “it is called pain when it is contrary to
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the will.”51 It is our own will that prevents us from acting out
against this pain. We can see this from the nature of will itself.
When explaining the way in which the Forms take hold of matter, Schopenhauer states that higher and more complex Forms do
not exterminate the lower, but appropriate them. For example,
the human Form appropriates crystallization in bone formation,
electricity in the brain, and chemical separation in the stomach.
He makes it clear that the higher are not epiphenomena reducible to the lower; but the higher, “swallowing up all of them,” appropriate the lower, for “variance with itself [is] essential to the
will . . . each wishes to reveal its own Idea.”52 The will’s essential
nature is to strive against itself, as Schopenhauer puts it, “the
will-to-live generally feasts on itself.”53 Thus, we must admit
that the inner struggle one feels as an ascetic is a perfect mirroring of the will’s essential nature which was supposed to be eliminated through asceticism.
To solve this problem, one must remember a distinction that
was suggested when examining the knowledge problem. According to the Brahma Sutras and the Kena Upanishad, the atman has some sort of agency. This agency must be sharply distinguished from want or desire. Although this issue has not been
developed well within the Indic tradition,54 there are some problems with attributing agency purely to the mind. If the mind is
the thing that works for liberation, then it is the thing liberated.
The atman was never deluded in the first place, and enlightenment has nothing to do with the atman. In this case the atman
would be the eternally “detached witness”55 that passively
watches the mind free itself of ignorance. A similar argument
states that if the body had agency within it, the atman would
again be stuck as a passive witness to a body which freed itself
by its own agency.
If Schopenhauer were to accept that will lies in the body and
in the material universe, but that the inner-most self retains some
amount of agency, he would not have the incoherency problem.
If the self has agency, then self-denial is not the contradictory self
-reflexivity it appears to be for Schopenhauer. Instead, it is a hierarchical ordering that is initiated by the inner-most self. In this
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situation Schopenhauer could retain his beliefs about the freedom of the will and the deterministic nature of the material
world. The self, which has agency, is totally free to make decisions. All motives and influences, however, are bound up with
the deterministically bound body. Only when a person has encountered certain ideas and experiences will that person be capable of choosing the path of philosophical enlightenment, or for
that matter, any other path. This seems to be what we encounter
in the world. It takes a certain disposition and set of experiences
to embrace any particular life.
To conclude, I will summarize the solutions and amendments
which I recommend Schopenhauer accept if he is to avoid the
aforementioned problems. If Schopenhauer accepts the following propositions, he will not run into the problems he does: 1)
The inner-most self has consciousness. 2) Consciousness is different, and more fundamental than, the intellect. 3) The self has a
type of basic agency which is different from wants and desires.
By accepting these three propositions, Schopenhauer can maintain a whole host of his beliefs which include, but are not limited
to: atheism, the priority of first hand experience in metaphysics,
the painful and transient nature of the material world, the freedom of self, the determinacy of the world, the legitimacy and reality of aesthetic contemplation, and finally the mystical belief in
the one-ness of all beings. It is my belief that with these changes,
the essential characteristics of Schopenhauer’s philosophy are
still preserved. Among modern philosophers, Schopenhauer is
the black sheep of the flock. His metaphysical system has more
in common with the ancients than any does any other system
from the modern period. As has been demonstrated, Schopenhauer can retain many of his essential beliefs even after these
changes. Although this paper is not the place to do so, it seems
appropriate that the next step for an admirer of Schopenhauer
would be to look into Schopenhauer’s influences. By doing this
one could determine the specific beliefs and concepts which lead
Schopenhauer into holding problematic doctrines.56 The natural
place to look would be in Kant, whose books greatly influenced
Schopenhauer’s views on consciousness and intellect. By exam-
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ining these three problems and suggesting further work to be
done, I have hoped to contribute not only to the legitimacy of
Schopenhauer as a philosopher; but also to the Vedanta tradition
which, though quite similar to many western philosophies, is
often not studied by western philosophers. Schopenhauer and
the Vedantins both have many merits which are often overlooked. By conducting research into these two philosophical systems I am attempting to display the merits and spread awareness
of both as relevant and important schools of thought.

Notes
1 The

other schools are Vaisesika, Nyaya, Yoga, Sankyha, and
Mimamsa.
2 The two other competitive sects were dvaita (dualism), and
vishishtadvaita (qualified non-dualism).
3 Some of the standard texts are the Vedas, the Upanishads, The
Bhagavad Gita, the Yoga Sutras, the Brahma Sutras, as well as
many others that are lesser known.
4 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (LaSalle: Open Court, 1974) 52-57. While the manifestation spoken of here deals with changes in matter, the other
three deal with true and false judgments, mathematics, and animal motivation. Human action is specifically determined by motivations and reasons, not physical causality.
5 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1 (Mineola: Dover, 1969) 178-181
6 Ibid., 127-130.
7 Ibid., 169.
8 Ibid., 105.
9 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume 2 (Mineola: Dover, 1969) 367.
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Ibid., 367.

11 Schopenhauer,

WWR Vol. 1, 99-103; “The whole body must be
nothing but my will become visible, must be my will itself.” 107.
12 Everyday awareness seems to lie somewhere between the two
extremes, although nearer the side of the will than the intellect.
The absolute egoist would have the other extreme state of perception, because he would be interested in things only insofar as
they did something for him.
13 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 177.
14 Ibid., 100.
15 Ibid., 184-194; This is what the genius and the madman have in
common, namely to perceive things apart from their cause, effects, or relations.
16 Patanjali, The Yoga Sutras, trans. Edwin F. Bryant (New York:
North Point Press, 2009) II.29.
17 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, I.17
18 Swami Vivekananda, who was a contemporary and friend of
Schopenhauer, says “when one struggles to take the elements out
of time and space, and think them as they are, it is called Nirvitarka, [the second stage of Samadhi].” Swami Vivekananda, Raja
Yoga (Kolkata: Advita Ashrama, 2007) 132. In this passage we
see a stage of Samadhi described in explicitly Kantian/
Schopenhauerian terms, illustrating that they are analogous, if
not identical.
19 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, I.17. In particular, Vacaspati Misra.
20 Different commentators name different parts of the Citta as the
most basic. Most of them agree that it is that most basic part
which is meditated upon in this stage of Samadhi.
21 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 308
22 Swami Gambhirananda, trans. Eight Upanishads Volume 1.
(Kolkata: Advaita Ashrama, 2008) 42
23 Eliot Deutsch and Rohit Dalvi, editors. Essential Vedanta: A New
Source Book of Advaita Vedanta. (Bloomington: World Wisdom,
2004) 45
24 Gambhirananda, Eight Upanishads Vol. 1, 40
25 Swami Gambhirananda, trans. Brahma-Sutra-Bhasya of Sri Sankaracarya. (Kolkata: Avaita Ashrama, 2000) II.iii.33-39
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The only reason we seem separated is because of Maya, or illusion, which often functions in a way similar to the principle of
sufficient reason, the cause of individuality for Schopenhauer.
27 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1. 119. Here Schopenhauer says that
time and space are present in consciousness, showing that he uses “consciousness” and “intellect” interchangeably among other
words.
28 Ibid., 397, “complete resignation or holiness, always proceeds
from that quieter of the will; and this is the knowledge of [the
will].
29 Ibid., 409.
30 Ibid., 164, “the will in itself … is an endless striving.” 196 “All
willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering.”
31 Arthur Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics
(Oxford: New York, 2010) 130.
32 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1. 378-398. Both of these phrases are
used and explained in this chapter.
33 Ibid., 411, “Before us there is certainly left only nothing.”
34 Ibid., 409
35 Ibid., 410.
36 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, II.15.
37 Prakriti is synonymous with the interaction or play of the
gunas. The gunas are analogous to something like atoms, while
prakriti is material nature in general.
38 The Vedantins maintain the oneness of all things. They will
either say that prakriti is the lower nature of Brahman, as is the
case in the Bhagavad-Gita, or they will say that prakriti is the
power of Maya used by Brahman. In either case the relationship
between atman and prakriti is fundamentally different from that
of the individual will and the fundamental will.
39 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, II.15.
40 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1, 146-147.
41 It should be noted here that the method for fixing this mistaken identity is any one of the paths of yoga, which include raja, or
meditation yoga; Karma, or action yoga; and Bhakti, or devotional
yoga (which is not discussed in this paper).
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Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans.
Maudemaire Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1998) 118, “man would much rather will nothingness than not
will...”
43 Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems, 217.
44 Ibid., 229.
45 Ibid., 212-213.
46 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1. 380.
47 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1. 380.
48 Ibid., 398-402; Schopenhauer, The Two Fundamental Problems,
142-142.
49 Schopenhauer, WWR Vol. 1. 398-399.
50 Ibid., 400-402.
51 Ibid., 101.
52 Ibid., 146-147.
53 Ibid., 147.
54 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras, 462-466.
55 Patanjali, Yoga Sutras. 466.
56 Mark Anderson, Pure: Modernity, Philosophy, and the One (San
Rafael: Sophia Perennis,
2009) 54-63; This is done from a Platonist perspective. This
chapter deals largely with Schopenhauer and seeks to critique
him from the point of view of Plotinus, in a similar manner that I
have done in this paper. Although the point of reference is different, the spirit of the book Pure is one that is largely taken up
here, and in that respect I am indebted to it.
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